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NOTE
The New Unconstitutionality of Juvenile Sex
Offender Registration: Suspending the Presumption
of Constitutionality for Laws that
Burden Juvenile Offenders
Spencer Klein*
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that Alaska’s sex offender registra-
tion and notification statute did not constitute punishment and was therefore
not susceptible to challenge under the Ex Post Facto Clause. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court looked to the seven factors articulated in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez. To evaluate those factors, the Court applied a presump-
tion of constitutionality, conducting the sort of narrow factual inquiry charac-
teristic of rational basis review. Since Smith, courts have disagreed as to
whether sex offender laws are punitive when applied to juveniles, and the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. This Note argues that the
Court should suspend the presumption of constitutionality when conducting
its ex post facto inquiry for laws that burden juvenile offenders. The Court
should do so because the very rationales that underlie the presumption are
inapplicable in both the case of juvenile offenders and the ex post facto con-
text. In lieu of rational basis review, this Note proposes a new framework
under which the Court may evaluate laws that burden juvenile offenders.
Under this new framework, a law is automatically punitive when it activates
one or more of three triggers. These triggers are activated when a sanction is
(1) irrevocable for life, (2) substantially likely to cause severe psychological
trauma, or (3) grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the offender.
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Introduction
Alexander D. of Michigan is not your paradigmatic sex offender.1 When
Alexander was seventeen, he was convicted of a sex offense after having sex
with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend, who was below Michigan’s age of con-
sent of sixteen.2 Since 2003, Alexander has registered as a sex offender, and
his personal information has been readily available on a public internet reg-
istry.3 As a result, he has lost jobs, fallen into poverty, and faced harassment
by passersby.4 His ex-girlfriend’s parents even wrote a letter requesting his
removal from the registry, but to no avail: Alexander will remain a registered
sex offender until 2028.5
Remarkably, Alexander’s story is far from unique. According to a 2009
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention bulletin, juveniles
comprise 25.8% of all sex offenders, and 35.6% of sex offenders known to
have committed a sex offense against minors.6 Among the juveniles who
committed sex offenses against minors, almost half were convicted of “fon-
dling,”7 and 9.5% were, like Alexander, convicted of a “nonforcible sex
offense.”8
Thirty-four states currently require that all juveniles who have been
convicted of a sex offense—whether they were convicted in criminal court as
1. See Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of
Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US 37–38 (2013), https://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0513_ForUpload_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4E-QVU5].
2. Id. at 37.
3. See id. at 37–38.
4. Id. at 38.
5. Id.
6. David Finkelhor et al., Juveniles Who Commit Sex Offenses Against Minors, Juv. Just.
Bull., Dec. 2009, at 1, 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227763.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3X57-PA36].
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
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adults or adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court—register on a sex of-
fender registry.9 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia require registra-
tion by only those convicted as adults.10 Among the states that require
registration of all juvenile sex offenders, nineteen states allow for publication
of the juveniles’ information.11 In twelve states, judges are not given discre-
tion to decide whether a juvenile must be subject to registration and com-
munity notification.12 Six states require lifetime registration for juveniles
who commit certain crimes.13
In implementing sex offender legislation, at both the state and federal
level, law enforcement officials have interpreted the laws to apply retroac-
tively.14 Retroactive application of sex offender laws raises constitutional
concerns. Under Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is
prohibited from passing an ex post facto law.15 Article I, Section 10 imposes
a similar prohibition on states.16 The ex post facto prohibition does not ap-
ply to all retroactive laws, only laws that inflict punishment.17
Unsurprisingly, sex offenders convicted before the passage of registra-
tion and notification laws have brought challenges to those laws under the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.18 With few exceptions, federal
courts have been unwilling to hear such challenges, stating that sex offender
laws do not constitute “punishment” and therefore cannot be assailed under
the Ex Post Facto Clause.19 Whether a law constitutes a punishment depends
on several factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,20 including
whether the law has a reasonable relationship to a nonpunitive purpose and
9. See Nicole Pittman & Quyen Nguyen, A Snapshot of Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws: A Survey of the United States 32 (2011), http://
www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/SNAPSHOT_web10-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3PX-
7B3W]. A juvenile may be convicted as an adult when, through one of several different proce-
dural mechanisms which vary across jurisdictions, the juvenile’s case has been transferred
from juvenile to adult court. See 2 Thomas A. Jacobs, Children and the Law: Rights &
Obligations § 8:6, at 117–20 (2016 ed.).




14. See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 932–33 (D. Neb. 2010) (holding that
the retroactive application of Nebraska’s sex offender registration law by state officials did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notifica-
tion Act, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2016) (interpreting the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act to apply to “all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for
which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act”).
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
16. Id. § 10, cl. 1.
17. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
18. E.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
19. See, e.g., id. at 92.
20. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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whether the law is excessive in relation to that purpose.21 In evaluating such
factors, courts have applied a presumption of constitutionality, assuming all
facts necessary to support the law’s constitutionality.22
This Note contends that courts should suspend the presumption of con-
stitutionality and conduct a more searching inquiry when determining
whether laws that burden juvenile offenders are punitive. This Note also
aims to provide a framework for assessing the constitutional rights of all
juvenile offenders, regardless of the nature or severity of their offense. Part I
provides a brief history of juvenile sex offender registration and discusses
constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and, in particular, juve-
nile registration. Part II argues that the presumption of constitutionality is
inappropriate when evaluating laws that burden juvenile offenders, since the
rationales underlying the presumption are inapplicable to juvenile offenders
and the ex post facto inquiry. Part III explains how a recent string of Su-
preme Court cases involving juvenile justice has introduced new principles
into the Court’s approach to the constitutional rights of juveniles, further
justifying a suspension of the presumption. Finally, Part IV provides a
framework under which courts should evaluate laws that burden juvenile
offenders under the Ex Post Facto Clause. This framework incorporates les-
sons from the Court’s earlier jurisprudence on the rights of juveniles dis-
cussed in Part III, and would treat as punitive sanctions that are (1)
irrevocable for life, (2) substantially likely to cause significant psychological
harm, and (3) grossly disproportionate to the offender’s culpability.
I. A Split on Whether Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration is Punitive
This Part provides an overview of courts’ divergent approaches to the
question of whether sex offender laws are punitive, both generally and as
applied to juvenile offenders. Many sex offenders have challenged their regis-
tration requirements under the Ex Post Facto Clause.23 For a challenge under
the Ex Post Facto Clause to move forward, however, a law must be shown to
21. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69 (1963). Altogether, the factors are as
follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has histori-
cally been regarded as a punishment whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribu-
tion and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. See, e.g., Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith, 538 U.S.
at 103).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013) (challenging juve-
nile registration under the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199 (5th Cir.
2009) (challenging adult registration under the Ex Post Facto Clause).
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be “punitive.”24 Section I.A discusses the Court’s treatment of adult sex of-
fender registration. Section I.B examines lower courts’ consideration and
recent scholarly discussion of juvenile sex offender registration.
A. Proving Punishment: Smith v. Doe
The Supreme Court has only considered sex offender laws through the
lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause once. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court
dismissed an ex post facto challenge brought by adult sex offenders against
Alaska’s registration and notification law.25 Under the Alaska law, anyone
convicted of a sex offense was required to register with law enforcement
officials.26 After registration, an offender’s information was forwarded to the
Department of Public Safety, which maintained a registry of sex offenders’
personal information, including registrants’ names, aliases, addresses, and
photographs.27 While not a requirement of the law, Alaska chose to make
most nonconfidential information available on the internet.28 The central
question in the case was whether Alaska’s law constituted a retroactive pun-
ishment, prohibited under the Ex Post Facto Clause.29
To determine whether a law is punitive, courts first look to legislative
intent.30 To ascertain legislative intent, courts start with the text and struc-
ture of the statute.31 Courts also look to the statute’s manner of codification
(i.e., whether it was placed in the criminal section of the state’s code) and
enforcement procedures.32 If it is clear that the legislature intended to im-
pose a punishment, then the measure is punitive and the inquiry ends
there.33 Even where a punishment is not intended, however, a law may be “so
punitive either in purpose or effect” that it transforms the measure from a
regulation into a punishment.34
Whether a law is punitive in effect depends on seven factors articulated
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.35 These factors, while not “exhaustive or
dispositive,”36 serve as “useful guideposts” in the Court’s analysis.37 In Smith,
the Court looked to five Mendoza-Martinez factors: “[W]hether [the
24. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
25. Id. at 105–06.
26. Id. at 90.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 91.
29. Id. at 89.
30. Id. at 92.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 94.
33. Id. at 92.
34. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
35. 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
36. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980))
(internal quotations omitted).
37. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).
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scheme] . . . has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punish-
ment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional
aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or
is excessive with respect to this purpose.”38
After concluding that the Alaska legislature did not intend to impose a
punishment in passing its sex offender registration law, the Court in Smith
moved on to the act’s effects. Going through each of the first three factors
articulated above, the Court concluded that each factor indicated that the
measure was not punitive in effect.39 The final two factors—the law’s ra-
tional connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether the law is excessive
in relation to that purpose—were considered by the Smith Court to be par-
ticularly significant40 and therefore received the most emphasis.41 These fac-
tors combined to form a rationality and excessiveness inquiry.
The Court found that the act passed this rationality–excessiveness in-
quiry. First, the Court held that the act had a legitimate nonpunitive goal of
public safety.42 According to the Court, this goal was advanced by keeping
the public informed of the risks of nearby sex offenders.43 Second, the Court
found that the act was not excessive in relation to the goal of public safety.44
The lower court found that the measure was excessive because “first . . . the
statute applies to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their future
dangerousness; and, second, [because] it places no limits on the number of
persons who have access to the information.”45 Dealing with the lower
court’s first contention, the Court pointed to the “frightening and high”
recidivism rates of sex offenders,46 and comparatively high likelihood that
sex offenders will be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault after re-
lease.47 Given a legislature’s power to make universal determinations as to
the dangerousness of a particular class, the evidence sufficed to support the
means employed.48 Additionally—presumably still responding to the lower
court’s concern that the act applied without regard to future dangerous-
ness—the Court found that the duration of the registration period was not
excessive.49 To support this contention, the Court pointed to evidence that
38. Id.
39. Id. at 97–102.
40. Id. at 102 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)).
41. See id. at 102–06.
42. Id. at 102–03.
43. Id. at 103.
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id. at 103.
46. Id. (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 104.
49. Id.
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convicted child molesters may reoffend as late as twenty years following re-
lease.50 Finally, as to the lower court’s second argument, the number of peo-
ple who have access to sex offenders’ information did not render the act
excessive, since sex offenders may reoffend anywhere in the country.51
The Smith Court went to great lengths to emphasize the narrowness of
the rationality–excessiveness inquiry.52 For the Court, the central question
was “whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the
nonpunitive objective.”53 The inquiry was not “an exercise in determining
whether the legislature has made the best possible choice to address the
problem it seeks to remedy.”54 This forgiving analysis is not unlike the ra-
tional basis test applied in the equal protection context: the question is not
whether the law is perfectly successful in achieving its goal, but rather
whether the law has some support such that it does not constitute an arbi-
trary exercise of power.55 Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, found
the case to be a close one but concluded that the laws were nonpunitive
because of the “presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s
law,”56 which “gives the State the benefit of the doubt in close cases.”57
Following Smith’s lead, circuit courts have largely deferred to the judg-
ment of the legislature in conducting the rationality–excessiveness inquiry.58
Indeed, with only one exception, no circuit court has ever held that a sex
offender law fails the rationality–excessiveness test. The lone exception, the
Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Does v. Snyder,59 does much to prove the rule. In
Does, the Sixth Circuit found the retroactive application of the Michigan Sex
Offenders Registration Act (SORA) to be punitive and therefore unconstitu-
tional.60 In conducting the rationality-excessiveness test, the court consid-
ered the legislature’s stated goals of promoting public safety and reducing
recidivism.61 The court found little to no evidence on the record to support
50. Id. (citing Robert A. Prentky et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files/163390.pdf [https://perma.cc/FED9-49DR]).
51. See id. at 104–05.
52. See id. at 105.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)
(“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.
It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
56. Smith, 538 U.S. at 110 (Souter, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Smith, 538 U.S. at 105); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smith,
538 U.S. at 103).
59. 834 F.3d 696, 704–06 (6th Cir. 2016).
60. Does, 834 F.3d at 705–06.
61. Id. at 704.
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the claim that SORA served either of these goals.62 Considering the stated
goal of reducing recidivism, the court found the evidence on the record
demonstrated SORA had, at best, no impact on recidivism.63 In fact, the
court found evidence in the record that the law may actually increase the risk
of recidivism.64 Compounding the court’s unwillingness to uphold SORA
was the State of Michigan’s failure to so much as analyze recidivism rates in
the state, despite having the necessary data to do so.65 As for public safety,
the court found that the record disclosed no relationship between SORA’s
registration requirements and public safety whatsoever.66 To uphold SORA,
the court found, would amount to writing a blank check to the legislature to
pass whatever laws it wished.67
B. Judicial and Academic Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration
Since Smith, courts have disagreed as to its holding’s applicability to
juvenile sex offender registration. Several state supreme courts have upheld
challenges to sex offender laws brought by juvenile offenders on the ground
that the laws imposed ex post facto punishments under their respective state
constitutions.68 In the federal courts, the majority of circuits to consider the
question have dismissed such challenges, citing Smith.69 The Ninth Circuit is
the only federal circuit to have struck down juvenile sex offender registration
under the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.70
In United States v. Juvenile Male (Juvenile Male II), the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the federal sex offender registration law was punitive when
applied to juveniles.71 To distinguish Smith, the court emphasized the confi-
dentiality of the juvenile justice system and the “pervasive and severe new
62. Id. at 704–05.
63. Id. at 704.
64. Id. at 704–05 (citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161, 161 (2011)).
65. Id. at 705.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (finding Alaska’s registration law
punitive and therefore invalid under the ex post facto clause of Alaska’s state constitution
when applied retroactively); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011) (same under the
Ohio Constitution).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding
that the application of federal sex offender registration law to juveniles did not constitute
punishment); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the applica-
tion of a federal sex offender registration law to an adult for a crime committed as a juvenile
did not constitute punishment). It should be noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit’s later
decision in Does v. Snyder, discussed supra Section I.A, which dealt with an adult challenge to
Michigan’s sex offender registration law, has potentially called the Shannon decision into
doubt.
70. United States v. Juvenile Male (Juvenile Male I), 581 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2009),
amended and superseded by 590 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 564 U.S. 932 (2011).
71. 590 F.3d 924, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
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and additional disadvantages that result from the mandatory registration of
former juvenile offenders and from the requirement that such former of-
fenders report in person to law enforcement authorities every 90 days for 25
years.”72 Still, the court was careful not to rest its conclusion on the rational-
ity–excessiveness prong of Mendoza-Martinez. Given the “limited nature of
[the court’s] inquiry” and the decision in Smith, the court chose not to give
the factor extensive weight.73 In other words, it concluded the laws were
punitive regardless of how the rationality–excessiveness inquiry might come
out.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on
grounds of mootness.74 Because the plaintiff in Juvenile Male II had turned
twenty-one during the pendency of the case, he was no longer subject to
ongoing registration as a special condition of supervision (which was im-
posed as a condition of his sentence in juvenile court).75 Without an ongoing
injury, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the case on the merits.76 Given the purely procedural nature of the
Supreme Court’s Juvenile Male II ruling, it remains an open question
whether sex offender registration is punitive when applied to juveniles.
Since Juvenile Male II, several academic articles have contended that sex
offender laws are punitive in effect under Mendoza-Martinez when applied
to juveniles.77 In applying the rationality–excessiveness inquiry, each article
has cited evidence showing that sex offender laws do not meaningfully serve
their purported goals, such as reducing recidivism and protecting the pub-
lic.78 In particular, the articles point to juvenile offenders’ diminished threat
to society, their chances for rehabilitation, and other developmental charac-
teristics that make sex offender registration counterproductive.79 What these
articles have failed to do, however, is show how this evidence can render
these laws excessive and irrational in light of the presumption of constitu-
tionality. Since sex offender laws typically contain some empirical support,80
72. Juvenile Male II, 590 F.3d at 927.
73. Id. at 941.
74. United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 933 (2011).
75. Id. at 933–34.
76. Id.
77. Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev.
746 (2014); Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 Hastings L.J. 1 (2013); Robin Walker
Sterling, Juvenile-Sex-Offender Registration: An Impermissible Life Sentence, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev.
295 (2015); Jessica E. Brown, Student Work, Classifying Juveniles “Among the Worst Offenders”:
Utilizing Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adoles-
cent Sex Offenders, 39 Stetson L. Rev. 369 (2010); Shannon C. Parker, Note, Branded for Life:
The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory and Lifetime Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication, 21 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 167 (2014).
78. See Carpenter, supra note 77, at 748–51; Halbrook, supra note 77, at 1; Sterling, supra
note 77, at 296; Brown, supra note 77, at 369–70; Parker, supra note 77, at 194–96.
79. See Carpenter, supra note 77, at 754–55; Halbrook, supra note 77, at 8–17; Sterling,
supra note 77, at 296; Brown, supra note 77, at 369–70; Parker, supra note 77, at 194–96.
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (pointing to the “frightening and
high” recidivism rates among sex offenders (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002))).
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courts have no reason to consider conflicting evidence when conducting a
rational basis test.81
II. Juvenile Offenders and the Presumption of Constitutionality
Since Smith, courts have conducted the ex post facto inquiry in a highly
deferential manner, applying the typical presumption of constitutionality.
Nonetheless, this Part contends that the presumption is inappropriate when
considering laws that burden juvenile offenders. Section II.A provides a brief
background on the Supreme Court’s suspension of the presumption in the
equal protection context. Section II.B reviews the rationales underlying the
presumption, demonstrating how those rationales are inapplicable in the
context of retroactive laws that burden juvenile offenders.
A. Presumption Suspended: Carolene Products and Its Progeny
The presumption of constitutionality forms the background against
which courts have considered almost all constitutional challenges to legisla-
tion.82 Even though it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,”83 declaring legislation unconstitutional
remains “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform.”84 Courts therefore go to great lengths to avoid invalidating legisla-
tion on constitutional grounds, presuming any state of facts necessary to
satisfy whatever test must be applied to the legislation.85
The most-cited narrowing of this presumption can be found in footnote
four in United States v. Carolene Products. Considering a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Filled Milk Act, the Court began with the premise that “the
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed.”86
In a footnote at the end of that same sentence, however, the Court implied
But see Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704–05 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that Michigan’s SORA
lacked any meaningful empirical support).
81. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 (“The excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurispru-
dence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possi-
ble to address the problem it seeks to remedy.”); United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487,
492 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] lower rate of recidivism among juveniles does not equate to no
recidivism, and even if adults have a higher recidivism rate, that does not mean that registra-
tion requirements are excessive.”).
82. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436 (1827) (“It has been truly said, that
the presumption is in favour of every legislative act, and that the whole burthen of proof lies
on him who denies its constitutionality.”).
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
84. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
85. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 283 (1932) (“[The presumption of
constitutionality] attaches to all legislative acts, and would require us to assume that there is
no state of facts reasonably to be conceived which could afford a rational basis for [supporting
constitutionality].”).
86. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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that it might be willing to take a more exacting look at legislation that dis-
plays prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities” which “tends to se-
riously curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities.”87 In those circumstances, as well as situa-
tions implicating fundamental rights, there may be a “narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality.”88
In the wake of footnote four came a line of cases under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause where certain minorities successfully challenged legislation
that treated their particular group unfavorably.89 Instead of ordinary “ra-
tional basis” review, the Supreme Court articulated more exacting standards
for equal protection review of legislation that discriminated based on certain
designated “suspect classifications,” including race,90 national origin,91 alien-
age,92 gender,93 and perhaps illegitimacy.94 For such classifications, courts no
longer ask if “there is an evil at hand for correction, and [whether] it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to cor-
rect it.”95 Instead, courts take a closer look at the evidence supporting the
legislation to determine whether the legislature’s measure was “narrowly tai-
lored [to serve a] compelling government interest[ ]”96 or “substantially re-
lated to” achievement of an important government interest,97 depending on
the case.
Furthermore, a law need not affect a suspect class for a court to suspend
the presumption of constitutionality. Even in the equal protection context,
courts have refused to apply heightened scrutiny to laws impacting certain
groups while nonetheless taking a more exacting look at such legislation
than they would under ordinary rational basis review.98 The first in this line
of cases was U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.99 In that case, the
Court invalidated an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that excluded any
household containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the
household from the program.100 Looking at the legislative history, the Court
87. Id. at 153 n.4.
88. Id. at 152 n.4.
89. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
90. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
91. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (recognizing national origin
as a suspect class in dictum).
92. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S 365, 372 (1971).
93. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210.
94. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
95. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
96. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
97. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
98. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding
that requiring a special use permit for a group home for the mentally disabled violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by animus against an unpopular group).
99. See 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
100. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
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determined that the amendment was adopted to exclude “hippies” from the
program.101 This motivation could not constitute a rational basis, the Court
held, because naked animus toward a politically unpopular group is not a
legitimate government interest.102 The Court used similar reasoning to inval-
idate a zoning ordinance preventing the construction of a home for the
mentally disabled.103 And in Romer v. Evans, the Court used its “animus”
approach to invalidate a state constitutional amendment banning civil rights
protections for homosexuals.104 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that
the legislation possessed a rational basis, but found that the animus behind
the legislation defeated any rational basis that might be claimed in its
favor.105 In stark contrast to traditional rational basis review, the Court in
Romer did not assume all facts necessary to pass a rational basis test.106
A brief aside is necessary to explain the relevance of the Court’s animus
jurisprudence to this Note. This Note does not argue that sex offender laws,
or any other law dealing with ex-offenders for that matter, are invalid due to
animus. Instead, this Note takes the Court’s animus line to evince a consti-
tutional concern with laws that seek to harm politically unpopular groups.
The Court’s articulation of a framework whereby the existence of one im-
permissible factor—in the above cases, animus—may outweigh or negate
other permissible factors will also be relevant later in this Note in its discus-
sion on certain “triggers” that may render legislation excessive.
The relevant question for purposes of this Part is not how such an in-
quiry might be conducted, but rather why courts choose to conduct such an
inquiry. The heightened scrutiny line of cases, together with Carolene Prod-
ucts, have led scholars to discern several important factors that compel a
court to extend such scrutiny to legislation affecting a certain class. Three of
those factors are relevant to this Note’s analysis: (1) political powerlessness,
(2) immutability, and (3) a history of discrimination.107
At first blush, relying on the key factors noted above, it would appear
that juvenile offenders have all the makings of a protected class under
Carolene Products. They are politically disempowered in two respects. As
felons, they are unable to vote after release from prison in thirty-five states,
101. Id. at 534.
102. Id.
103. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
104. 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996).
105. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
106. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96
Marq. L. Rev. 377, 396 (2012) (“The [Romer] Court never stated the standard of review that
it was applying, but it appeared to place the burden of proving the law’s rationality and legiti-
macy squarely on Colorado.”).
107. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 Ca-
lif. L. Rev 1191, 1207 (2006). The fourth and final factor, inherent suspicion, deals with a line
of cases that suggest that certain classifications are inherently suspicious. Id. at 1214. This
factor typically only emerged in the context of race-based classifications, id., and therefore
does not play a role in an analysis of juvenile offenders as a class.
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and are permanently disenfranchised in four states.108 Additionally, as
juveniles, they are unable to vote prior to turning eighteen in most jurisdic-
tions in the United States.109 The question of immutability is trickier with
respect to juveniles. While everyone will eventually change the characteristic
of their youth, it is impossible to change the trait at a given moment, and
children did not choose to enter into the classification of being a juvenile.
Ultimately, whether youth is immutable depends on the appropriate defini-
tion of immutability, a matter that is far from a settled.110 At the very least,
one plausible definition of immutability (that an immutable trait is one that
is not chosen by its possessor)111 would treat youth as an immutable charac-
teristic. Finally, children have faced discrimination, albeit of a widely socially
tolerable variety, throughout history.112 Nonetheless, no court has explicitly
recognized ex-offenders, juveniles, or juvenile offenders, as a suspect class,
and many have outright rejected that characterization.113
Merely falling within the letter of footnote four, then, is insufficient to
accord a class protected status. Indeed, some consider classifying any group
of ex-offenders as a suspect class to be a most absurd extension of the
Carolene Products principles.114 Many groups have faced a history of discrim-
ination and political disempowerment due to immutable characteristics; to
designate each of those groups as protected classes would effectively destroy
the presumption of constitutionality, turning the Equal Protection Clause
into an ever-present referee of the legislative process, designating the minor-
ity the eternal winners and the majority eternal losers.
108. The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Felony Disenfranchisement 4 (2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Felony-Disenfranchisement-
Laws-in-the-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJQ8-PX4E].
109. But see Elena Schneider, Students in Maryland Test Civic Participation and Win Right
to Vote, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2015, at A12, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/us/politics/
students-in-maryland-test-civic-participation-and-win-right-to-vote.html?_r=0 [https://per
ma.cc/6AUU-ZHB6] (discussing two cities in Maryland that lowered the voting age to 16).
110. See Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens and the
Future of Same Sex Marriage, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 3–9 (2009) (discussing competing
definitions of immutability and arguing in favor of a definition of immutability that depends
on whether someone “chose” to enter into their classification).
111. See id. at 47.
112. See, e.g., Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Stan-
dards & the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 653, 671–72 (2000)
(discussing various ways in which children have been discriminated against throughout his-
tory, including prohibitions on purchase of “girlie” magazines and selling magazines in a pub-
lic place, as well as prohibitions on driving and voting).
113. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (refusing to recognize age as a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause); United States v. Juvenile Male (Juve-
nile Male III), 670 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that juvenile sex offenders over the
age of fourteen were not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause); United States v.
LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Sex offenders are not a suspect class.”).
114. E.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 Yale L.J. 2, 84 (2015) (warning
against the “slippery slope” of expanding equal protection and characterizing ex-offenders as
“the reductio ad absurdum of expansive concepts of the protected class”).
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B. Rationales for the Presumption and Juvenile Offenders
in the Ex Post Facto Context
This Section will outline the basic rationales for the presumption of
constitutionality and explain how they are inapplicable to laws that burden
juvenile offenders and to the ex post facto inquiry. As established above,
extending protected status to juvenile offenders on the basis of the Carolene
Products principles alone would prove too much. In order to advocate for a
suspension of the presumption for juvenile offenders, then, it is necessary to
look beyond the face of Carolene Products and its progeny to determine the
scope of the presumption of constitutionality. This Section focuses on the
basic rationales underlying the presumption in order to determine its
breadth. If those rationales are inapplicable, the presumption ought not to
apply.
There are four rationales for the presumption of constitutionality. First,
courts presume constitutionality because legislatures are democratically ac-
countable.115 Legislators, not courts, are chosen directly by the people, and it
is the legislators who have been entrusted with the responsibility to make
sensitive policy decisions.116 Second, the presumption is justified by the insti-
tutional superiority of the legislature.117 While the process of judicial fact-
finding is a narrow one—pertaining only to the parties before the court—
the legislative process is more far-reaching: legislatures conduct hearings,
consult experts, and take testimony over a long period of time.118 Third, the
presumption is grounded in “due respect” for legislators: as a coordinate
branch of government, the judiciary should respect the determinations of
the legislature.119 Finally, the presumption is based on considerations of ad-
ministrability: a finding of unconstitutionality inevitably gives rise to a host
of new lawsuits and may slow down the legislative process in the future.120
The intuition underlying the democratic accountability rationale is that
the Constitution embodies certain republican ideals, including the proposi-
tion that “policy decisions should be made by the legislators who are ac-
countable to the people through elections.”121 By electing lawmakers, voters
decide whom they trust to make certain policy determinations.122 When a
115. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1447, 1469 (2010).
116. Id. (citing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 74 (1980)).
117. Id. at 1472.
118. See id. at 1473 (“Legislatures have more resources than courts to gather informa-
tion—they have large staffs, general subpoena power, and large institutions such as the Con-
gressional Research Service to facilitate their factfinding . . . .”).
119. Id. at 1462 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 607 (2000)). The due-
respect rationale closely resembles the legitimacy rationale—namely, the rationale that over-
turning legislation threatens the legitimacy of the legislature. See id. at 1483. For purposes of
this Note, they will be discussed as one and the same.
120. Id. at 1482.
121. Id. at 1469 (citing Ely, supra note 116, at 74).
122. See id.
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court strikes down democratically enacted laws, it runs the risk of displacing
a legislature’s policy judgments with its own, thereby impeding the demo-
cratic process.123 When plaintiffs—be they bakery owners, kosher butchers,
or opticians—are negatively impacted by certain laws, their grievances may
be expressed through the democratic process.124
In the case of juvenile offenders, however, the democratic-accountability
rationale is inapplicable.125 As Carolene Products and later cases recognize,
this rationale necessitates a well-functioning democratic process.126 When
the individuals impacted by a law have had no say in its passage, there is less
reason to privilege the viewpoints of legislators over those of unelected
judges by virtue of their accountability to voters. From the perspective of a
disenfranchised juvenile felon, the judge and the legislator look exactly the
same: he didn’t elect either of them.127 Through this lens, the case of juvenile
offenders is particularly compelling. Not only are juvenile offenders pre-
cluded from voting by virtue of their age,128 it is possible they will remain
disenfranchised into some of their adulthood, and perhaps the rest of their
lives.129
Moreover, for juvenile offenders—particularly juvenile sex offenders—it
makes little difference that parents may represent the juvenile offenders’ in-
terests through the democratic process. For sex offenders, any surrogate
voice that an offender’s parents might provide must contend with the
cacophony of worried parents who fear that their child will be the next vic-
tim of a sex offender, and not that their child will become a sex offender
himself.130 And while other types of juvenile offenders may not face the same
prejudice, many lack one or both parents to act as stand-ins in the political
123. Id.
124. See id. (“If the people disapprove of legislation, they may replace their representatives
in Congress, and the new representatives may enact more popular laws.”).
125. See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
juveniles’ lack of a right to vote places youth outside of “those political processes ordinarily . . .
relied upon to protect minorities” (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) (“The presumption
of constitutionality and the approval given ‘rational’ classifications in other types of enact-
ments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state government are structured so
as to represent fairly all the people.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (discussing prejudice “which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”).
127. See discussion supra Section I.A.
128. Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of the
Electoral Majority, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 1447, 1448 (2012) (“The voting age in every U.S. state is
eighteen . . . .”).
129. See The Sentencing Project, supra note 108, at 1.
130. See Kristen M. Zgoba, Spin Doctors and Moral Crusaders: The Moral Panic Behind
Child Safety Legislation, 17 Crim. Just. Stud. 385, 386 (2004) (discussing how sensationalized
media coverage of child abductions and sex crimes have created a “fear factor” among parents,
leading them to demand stricter restrictions on sex offenders).
1380 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1365
process. A 2010 survey revealed that less than half of youths in custody were
raised by both parents; 11% were not raised by either parent.131
The institutional-superiority rationale is similarly inapplicable.132 Under
this rationale, courts should defer to legislatures because legislatures have
more expertise, better resources, and greater “familiarity with [the] local
conditions” that gave rise to the legislation in question.133 But the reach of
this rationale is unclear, since a court has more expertise than a legislature
on certain matters. For example, the Supreme Court has refused to defer to
the legislature on whether a certain activity has a substantial impact on in-
terstate commerce, considering it a “judicial[,] rather than a legislative,
question.”134
The structure of the Constitution and the Court’s holdings illustrate
that the determination of whether a law constitutes a punishment is much
better suited for the judiciary than the legislature. The Bill of Attainder
Clause prohibits the legislature from determining the guilt or innocence of a
particular party or prescribing an appropriate punishment for a particular
party.135 The Court’s subsequent interpretations of that clause reflect an un-
derstanding that the act of punishment is a judicial task.136 Similarly, the
Eighth Amendment limits the degree to which a legislature may impose
punishment.137 Through its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
has independently confronted factual questions regarding the excessiveness
of a punishment.138 If questions of such comparatively recent vintage as
whether an activity has “a substantial relation to interstate commerce”139 fall
131. Andrea J. Sedlak & Carol Bruce, Youth’s Characteristics and Backgrounds: Findings
from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, Juv. Just. Bull., Dec. 2010, at 1, 6, https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227730.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7FD-J6QM].
132. See generally Hessick, supra note 115, at 1472.
133. Id. (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451–52 (1991)).
134. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 614 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
135. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
136. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965) (“Thus the Bill of Attainder
Clause . . . reflected the Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as
politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of,
and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.”); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
277, 323 (1866) (“[T]he legislative body . . . [passes a Bill of Attainder when it] exercises the
powers and office of judge; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon the guilty of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial; it
determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evi-
dence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of
the enormity of the offence.” (emphasis added)).
137. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
138. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (conducting “judicial exercise of
independent judgment” to determine whether life without parole was excessive when applied
to juveniles who did not commit homicide).
139. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59
(1995)).
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within the purview of judges, then whether something is punishment is also
a judicial question.
In the case of laws targeting juvenile offenders, legislatures often prove
an inferior forum to air the relevant facts and make policy decisions. In the
mid to late nineties, state legislatures began to advocate a “get tough” ap-
proach to juvenile justice, advocating for more punitive sanctions for juve-
nile offenders.140 These developments came despite declining juvenile crime
rates.141 A review of these developments suggests that legislators were pan-
dering to the public’s fears rather than responding to empirical data on the
threats posed by juvenile offenders and the best way to abate those threats.142
One study attributed this tendency to lawmakers’ fear of public backlash:
softening policies toward juvenile offenders, or any offenders for that matter,
could spell the kiss of death for political careers.143 Judges, by contrast, are
not, and in our constitutional system must not be, subject to the pressures of
public outrage.144 Instead, we expect judges to make decisions calmly and
without fear of popular reprisal.145 Accordingly, judges are better suited to
confront questions related to the punishment of juvenile offenders.
The administrability and due-respect rationales merit less discussion.
Those concerns often arise when a court overturns legislation, yet the invali-
dation of a sex offender law does not implicate these concerns any more
than other cases in which the court has invalidated legislation. Take, for
instance, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of federal legislation in United
States v. Lopez.146 In that case, the Court invalidated federal legislation
prohibiting the possession of a gun on school grounds, finding that Con-
gress did not have the power to make such a law.147 This ruling raised due-
140. Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role
of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile
Justice System, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1303, 1307 n.17 (2000).
141. Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Juvenile Justice: The Legacy of Punitive Policy, 6
Youth Violence & Juv. Just. 28, 30 (2008).
142. Coupet, supra note 140, at 1307.
143. Benekos & Merlo, supra note 141, at 29.
144. See The Federalist No. 78, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009)
(“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjectures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”).
145. Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965) (“Every one must concede that a
legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of
its members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popu-
lar clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a crimi-
nal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly excited—the very
class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode.” (quoting 1 Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations 536–37 (8th ed. 1927))).
146. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
147. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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respect concerns by invalidating an act passed by a coordinate branch in its
entirety.148 The case also raised administrability concerns by opening the
door to a host of new challenges to Congress’s Commerce Clause power,149
some of which were ultimately successful.150 There is nothing special about
the case of sex offender laws, or other related criminal justice statutes, that
makes overturning them less respectful or less administrable than a ruling
like Lopez.
Taken together, the inapplicability of each of the rationales for the pre-
sumption should lead courts to conduct a more exacting inquiry when eval-
uating sex offender laws that burden juveniles to determine whether they
constitute punishment. This approach carries forward the principles of
Carolene Products and its progeny by protecting a politically disempowered
group, responding to legislatures’ consideration of impermissible factors,
and preserving the Court’s ability to review legislation for constitutionality
free from the biases of voting majorities.
III. Children Are Different: The Miller Line
and the Presumption
While the Court has not explicitly suspended the presumption of consti-
tutionality for laws that burden juvenile offenders, it has begun to move in
that direction in a series of recent Fifth and Eighth Amendment cases related
to juvenile sentencing and interrogation. Section III.A summarizes these
cases and discusses three characteristics recognized in these cases that make
children different for constitutional purposes. Section III.B examines the rel-
evance of these three characteristics in the ex post facto context. Section
III.C asserts that these cases herald a suspension of the presumption of con-
stitutionality for laws that burden juvenile offenders.
A. The Miller Line: The Constitutional Rights of Juveniles
Recent Supreme Court decisions have created a special constitutional
space for children. The underlying ethos of this jurisprudential shift is that
“children are different.”151 Each case in this line recognizes certain distin-
guishing characteristics that make all children different for constitutional
purposes.
148. Id. at 549.
149. Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 551 (1995) (“There will, at a mini-
mum, be substantial transaction costs in the form of litigation fleshing out what Lopez
means.”).
150. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 617 (2000) (finding the civil rem-
edy of the Violence Against Women Act to be invalid as Commerce Clause legislation).
151. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
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The first of these cases dealt with the use of the death penalty on chil-
dren. Christopher Simmons committed capital murder at the age of seven-
teen.152 After he turned eighteen, he was sentenced to death.153 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court found that Christopher’s death sentence was unconsti-
tutional, holding that carrying out the death penalty on anyone for a crime
committed before the age of eighteen was per se unconstitutional under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.154 The Court based this conclusion on
several factors. First, the Court noted that a majority of legislatures have
proscribed the use of the death penalty on juveniles.155 Additionally, and
most relevant for the purposes of this Note, the Court recognized that chil-
dren possess certain distinguishing characteristics that make them less de-
serving of the most severe punishments.156 These characteristics are
discussed at greater length in the following Section.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court expanded this per se ban to the sen-
tence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders
who did not commit homicide.157 In that case, Terrance Graham was con-
victed of armed burglary, a crime he committed at the age of sixteen, and
was sentenced to life in prison.158 Because Terrance was convicted in Florida,
a state that had abolished its parole system, Terrance had “no possibility of
release except [by] executive clemency.”159 Looking again to national consen-
sus, the Court found that only eleven states actually imposed LWOP for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders (although twenty-six did allow it).160 Fol-
lowing Roper, the Court pointed to the distinguishing characteristics that
make juveniles less deserving of the most severe punishments.161 In Miller v.
Alabama, the Court went even further, holding mandatory LWOP unconsti-
tutional for all juvenile offenders and allowing for LWOP to be imposed only
after an individualized hearing.162
The principle that children are different is not limited to the sentencing
context, or even the Eighth Amendment context. As the Miller Court recog-
nized, “[I]t is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception
for children.”163 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court carried the principle
that children are different beyond the Eighth Amendment and held that a
child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis under the Fifth
152. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 578–79.
155. Id. at 568.
156. Id. at 568–75.
157. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
158. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id. at 69–71.
162. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). The Court later held that Miller applies retroactively.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
163. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
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Amendment.164 In J.D.B., the petitioner, a thirteen-year-old, was adjudicated
delinquent in juvenile court based on statements obtained after officers
questioned him in a closed-door conference room at his school.165 The of-
ficers did not read J.D.B. his Miranda warnings.166 J.D.B.’s public defender
filed a motion to suppress, contending that the statement was unlawfully
obtained since the questioning in the conference room constituted a custo-
dial interrogation, which required Miranda warnings.167 Whether there has
been a custodial interrogation depends on two objective factors: the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation and whether a reasonable person, in
light of those circumstances, would feel at liberty to leave.168 In J.D.B., the
Court found that courts must consider a child’s age in conducting this anal-
ysis.169 Instead of a “reasonable person” standard, the Court effectively im-
posed a “reasonable juvenile” standard for custody analysis.170 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court once again emphasized children’s distinguishing
characteristics.171
B. Children’s Differences
Each case in the Miller line took notice of certain distinguishing charac-
teristics borne by juveniles that make them different for constitutional pur-
poses. Upon closer examination, these differences prove applicable and
highly relevant in the ex post facto context.
First, the Miller line recognizes that children are more psychologically
vulnerable and more susceptible to negative outside influences.172 In J.D.B.,
for example, the court reiterated that “events that ‘would leave a man cold
and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.’ ”173
This increased vulnerability is of particular importance in the Miranda anal-
ysis, since, as discussed above, Miranda protections attach only where, as an
objective matter, the suspect would not feel at liberty to leave the interroga-
tion setting.174
164. 564 U.S. 261, 272, 274–75, 281 (2011).
165. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 265–68.
166. Id. at 266.
167. Id. at 266–67.
168. Id. at 270.
169. Id. at 271–72.
170. Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts
a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody
Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 501, 517 (2012).
171. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272–77.
172. Id. at 275 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
173. Id. at 272 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion)).
174. Id. at 270 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam)).
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Second, the Miller line declares that children are less culpable than their
adult counterparts.175 In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer explained
that this is because of a “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of re-
sponsibility.”176 Diminished culpability factors strongly into the inquiry re-
garding proportionality, which requires that a sanction be graded to the
culpability of the offender, considering both the offender’s characteristics
and the severity of his offense.177
Third, the Miller line stands for the proposition that a child’s criminal
tendencies are not fixed, and that children are more likely to reform.178 The
Court based this conclusion on both “common sense” and “science and so-
cial science as well.”179 For example, studies have shown that only a small
proportion of adolescent offenders “develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior.”180 The Court also noted “fundamental differences between juve-
nile and adult minds,” especially in “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control.”181
As scholars have recognized, the characteristics recognized in the Miller
line migrate quite easily to the Court’s ex post facto doctrine.182 The first
characteristic—children’s heightened vulnerability—bears on the “affirma-
tive disability or restraint” factor of Mendoza-Martinez. As the Ninth Circuit
recognized in Juvenile Male, what may be a trivial burden for an adult can be
a significant one for a child.183 This harm goes beyond the simple release of
otherwise confidential information pertaining to juvenile justice proceed-
ings. Current research shows that juvenile sex offenders are subject to har-
assment and have significant trouble finding a job, reintegrating, and finding
housing as a result of registration and notification.184
The second characteristic—children’s diminished culpability—is rele-
vant to whether a measure is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive goal.
Culpability might appear at first to be inapplicable in the ex post facto con-
text. If children are indeed less culpable it should change the punishment
175. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 72 (2010)).
176. Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010)).
177. Id. (majority opinion).
178. Id. at 2464–65 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
179. Id. at 2464 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
180. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
181. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
182. See Sterling, supra note 77, at 313 (“[E]ach of the Court’s aforementioned [children
are different] cases contributes to the reasoning necessary to hold that sex-offender registra-
tion is punishment for juveniles.”); see also Parker, supra note 77 at 189–96 (reviewing social
science research on juveniles to demonstrate its impact on each of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors).
183. See United States v. Juvenile Male (Juvenile Male II), 590 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir.
2009).
184. See Halbrook, supra note 77, at 17 (discussing the special burdens on juvenile sex
offenders and their families associated with registration).
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they receive, but it should not bear on whether or not something is a pun-
ishment in the first place. Still, while courts have not yet considered culpa-
bility as a factor in the ex post facto context, it has played a role in the
similar rational basis test of the Equal Protection Clause.185 Additionally,
courts consider a host of factors when determining whether a sanction is
excessive,186 and culpability intuitively factors into such a test. For example,
consider a hypothetical punishment that, to keep streets clean, requires civil
commitment of those who have littered. In that case, the low blameworthi-
ness of litterers (in reference to the offense) weighed against the severe bur-
den of civil commitment would be a factor in determining whether the
burden is excessive in relation to its goal. Similarly, the low culpability of
juvenile offenders (in reference to their characteristics) is relevant to
whether sex offender registration is excessive in relation to its goal.
The third characteristic—that children have greater prospects for re-
form—strongly implicates the rationality–excessiveness prong of the Court’s
Mendoza-Martinez analysis: whether the measure is rationally related to a
nonpunitive purpose and whether it is excessive in relation to that purpose.
While the Court in Smith made only brief references to empirical data on
recidivism, it placed a significant weight on the high recidivism statistics
among sex offenders.187 For juvenile offenders, however, recidivism rates are
low.188 One study, for example, revealed that juvenile sex offenders were sig-
nificantly less likely than other juvenile offenders to be charged with any
general or felony offense after release.189 Additionally, juvenile sex offenders
do not show a significantly different rate of recidivism for sexual offenses as
compared to other juvenile offenders.190 Further, juvenile sex offenders are
more likely than adult sex offenders to cease inappropriate sexual behavior if
185. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (finding that a state lacked a rational basis
for discriminating against undocumented children in education because it imposed a burden
on the basis of “a legal characteristic over which [the] children can have little control,” and
that there was no rational justification “for penalizing these children for their presence within
the United States”).
186. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103–05 (2003) (considering the geographical reach,
risk assessment, and length of time of sex offender registration).
187. See id. at 103 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)).
188. Michael F. Caldwell, Sexual Offense Adjudication and Sexual Recidivism Among Juve-
nile Offenders, 19 Sex Abuse 107 (2007) [hereinafter Caldwell, Sexual Offense Adjudication];
Halbrook, supra note 77, at 13 (citing Michael F. Caldwell et al., An Examination of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act as Applied to Juveniles: Evaluating the Ability to Pre-
dict Sexual Recidivism, 14 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 89, 101 (2008)) (discussing juvenile sex
offenders’ low rates of recidivism); Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Kevin S. Armstrong, Recidivism
Rates for Registered and Nonregistered Juvenile Sex Offenders, 20 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. &
Treatment 393, 403 (2008); Franklin E. Zimring et al., Investigating the Continuity of Sex
Offending: Evidence from the Second Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study, 26 Just. Q. 58, 58 (2009);
Franklin E. Zimring et al., Sexual Delinquency in Racine: Does Early Sex Offending Predict Later
Sex Offending in Youth and Young Adulthood?, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 507, 522 (2007)).
189. Caldwell, Sexual Offense Adjudication, supra note 188, at 110.
190. Id.
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they receive appropriate treatment.191 Between the Court’s recognition of
juvenile offenders’ greater prospects for reform192 and the scholarly recogni-
tion of juvenile sex offenders’ low recidivism rates, the Court has good rea-
son to consider juvenile sex offender registration excessive in relation to its
nonpunitive goal.
C. The Miller Line and the Presumption of Constitutionality
Beyond recognizing basic facts about juveniles, the Miller line reflects
the Court’s willingness to take a more exacting look at government measures
that impact juveniles. In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has been
generally hesitant to strike down punishments as cruel and unusual.193 What
has motivated the Court in the Miller line, unlike past Eighth Amendment
cases, was not the nature of the punishment, but the nature of the punished.
With the exception of Atkins v. Virginia (striking down the death penalty
when used on someone who was mentally disabled),194 the Miller line repre-
sents the only instance where the Supreme Court has carved out a specific
class of individuals who may not be subject to certain punishments.
Additionally, the methodology in Miller exhibited less deference to legis-
latures than previous cases. Instead of conducting its usual “objective indi-
cia” analysis—tallying the laws of each state to ascertain national consensus
before exercising its judgment (a rough form of deference)—the Miller
Court relied exclusively on precedent and empirical data.195 Tallying was in-
appropriate in Miller, according to Justice Kagan, because the case involved
the requirement of more process before punishment, rather than a categori-
cal bar on certain punishments.196
Nonetheless, scholars have recognized that the methodology employed
by Justice Kagan in Miller is widely applicable throughout Eighth Amend-
ment cases.197 Professor Ian Farrell sees Miller as paving the way for the
Court to employ a strict scrutiny analysis to punishments that impact par-
ticular groups (such as children or the mentally disabled), punish certain
crimes (such as crimes of omission), or are of a certain severity (death).198
191. Halbrook, supra note 77, at 11 (citing Ass’n for the Treatment of Sexual Abus-
ers, A Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex Offender Policy to Prevent Child Sexual
Abuse 15 (2011)).
192. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010)).
193. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28–31 (2003) (affirming sentence of
twenty-five years to life in prison under a three strikes law).
194. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
195. Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
853, 900–01 (2013) (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)).
196. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
197. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 195, at 902–03.
198. See id. at 856–57.
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The process-versus-categorical-bar distinction, Farrell recognizes, has no ba-
sis in precedent.199 After all, the Court looked to objective indicia in past
Eighth Amendment “process” cases.200 This quibble may not have much
bearing on a discussion of juvenile sex offender registration, since a finding
that registration is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive goal may only
require individualized assessment for future risk (i.e., more process).201
Whatever the methodological implications of Miller, each case in the Miller
line demonstrates the Court’s willingness to rely on empirical data and inde-
pendent judgment instead of deferring to legislative judgment when consid-
ering sanctions that burden juveniles.202
Given the methodology of the Miller line, and Miller in particular, it
appears that the Court is moving toward a suspension of the presumption of
constitutionality for government actions that impact juvenile offenders. The
weakness of the rationales discussed in Part II, together with the principles
of the Miller line, command a suspension of the presumption.
IV. Three Triggers: A Proposed Framework
The previous two Parts explained why a departure from the presump-
tion of constitutionality is appropriate when assessing laws that burden juve-
nile offenders. This Part briefly details how the Court should conduct the ex
post facto inquiry for laws that impact juvenile offenders after suspending
the presumption of constitutionality. This Part contends that courts should
find laws punitive when they impose requirements on juvenile offenders that
are (1) irrevocable for life, (2) substantially likely to cause objectively severe
psychological harm, or (3) grossly disproportionate to the offender’s
culpability.
Typically, after a court suspends the presumption of constitutionality, it
will conduct an inquiry that is more searching than rational basis review.203
Under the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply tiers of scrutiny.204 For clas-
sifications on the basis of race, for example, courts apply strict scrutiny,
asking whether the measure in question is narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling government interest.205 The lowest tier of scrutiny above simple ra-
tional basis is the Court’s rational basis plus test.206 Under that test, the
199. See id. at 902–03.
200. Id. at 902 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976)).
201. See Halbrook, supra note 77, at 54 (arguing for individualized risk assessment before
a juvenile is placed on a sex offender registry).
202. Even where the Court did tally the legislative pronouncements of other states, the
Court did not find them “determinative” of the Eighth Amendment question, and turned to
“[t]he judicial exercise of independent judgment.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010);
see, e.g., id. at 67–71 (considering social science data and precedent in determining that LWOP
for juvenile offenders did not serve legitimate penological goals).
203. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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existence of animus toward a particular community overrides any rational
basis that might exist for the legislation and renders the law constitutionally
invalid.207
When analyzing laws that impact juvenile offenders, courts should apply
a standard similar to the Court’s rational basis plus approach. Instead of
having animus defeat a rational basis, however, three “triggers” should hold
the place of “animus.” If any one of these triggers is activated by a law,
courts should find that the law is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive
purpose and declare the law punitive. These three triggers—(1) lifetime ir-
revocability, (2) substantial likelihood of objectively severe psychological
harm, and (3) gross disproportionality—closely track the three principles of
the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence discussed above.208
The value of this trigger-based framework becomes clear when applied
specifically to laws requiring retroactive juvenile registration. Under the first
trigger, courts should invalidate juvenile registration as an ex post facto pun-
ishment if it imposes registration that is irrevocable for life. This closely
relates to the idea that children have greater prospects for reform.209 Lifetime
juvenile registration runs afoul of this ideal. First, lifetime registration has
been shown to impede reform: for example, registration socially isolates
juveniles, potentially increasing criminal behavior.210 Second, and relatedly,
the Court has recognized that most juveniles outgrow criminal behavior,211
and that such behavior is largely attributable to youthful characteristics.212 In
light of this, it is manifestly senseless to force them to register as offenders
until the day of their death. This trigger, unlike the following two, is suited
to a facial challenge: if a statute imposes lifetime irrevocability, it is invalid in
all applications.
Under the second trigger, courts should consider juvenile registration
punitive where it is substantially likely to cause objectively severe psychologi-
cal harm. As the Court has recognized, juveniles are more vulnerable than
adults.213 Research into juvenile sex offenders corroborates this judicial dec-
laration. As one scholar has noted,
207. See id.
208. See discussion supra Part III.
209. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010)).
210. See Halbrook, supra note 77, at 17 (citing Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Atti-
tudes of Registered Female Sex Offenders, 68 Fed. Probation 30, 31 (2004)) (discussing the
isolation that results from sex offender registration and residency restriction, which may po-
tentially increase risky delinquent or criminal behavior); Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Percep-
tions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, Analyses Soc. Issues & Pub.
Pol’y, Dec. 2007, at 1, 3–4.
211. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
212. Id. at 2464–65 (“We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness, proclivity
for risk, and inability to assess consequences . . . enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by
and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’ ” (quoting Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010))).
213. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2011) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
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Research on adolescent brain development indicates that youth are particu-
larly vulnerable to the stigma and isolation that registration and notifica-
tion create. To be labeled and therefore self-identified as a “sex offender” as
a child will likely permanently undermine a person’s self-worth and create
lasting mental health problems such as depression and substance abuse.214
This trigger also relates to the above-referenced ideal that children have great
prospects for reform. With severe psychological trauma comes a potentially
greater likelihood of reoffending.215 Precisely what constitutes objectively se-
vere psychological trauma remains an open and difficult question. Nonethe-
less, there are many areas of law courts may look to for guidance. Common
law doctrine surrounding negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, for example, is rife with line drawing regarding psychological inju-
ries.216 This trigger would be evaluated under an as-applied rubric. That is to
say, the psychological damage must be severe for the particular offender,
taking into account the offender’s predisposition.
Finally, courts should consider juvenile registration punishment when it
is grossly disproportionate to the offender’s culpability, both in reference to
the severity of his offense and his distinguishing characteristics. This trigger
responds to juveniles’ reduced culpability.217 As discussed above, the relation
between the sanction and a person’s culpability bears on whether the matter
is excessive in relation to a nonpunitive purpose; when a government mea-
sure necessitates the infliction of a grossly disproportionate burden, the pos-
sibility of excess grows.218 Take, for example, the case of Alexander D.
Alexander is currently subject to registration requirements because he had
sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend when he was seventeen.219 Alexander’s
diminished culpability (as well as his diminished dangerousness) makes his
registration obligations excessive. In a case like Alexander’s, the third trigger
should be activated, making his long-term registration a punishment that is
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause. This prong allows for a tailoring of
the registration period to meet the requirements of proportionality, since it
is the length, and not the fact, of a term of registration that makes it dispro-
portionate. Similar to the second trigger, challenges under this trigger would
be brought as applied.
A likely criticism of the last two triggers is that they require case-by-case
analysis, leading to costly litigation and unequal outcomes. This may be the
case, but it is the very risk Miller and J.D.B. insist we take. Because of the
214. Parker, supra note 77, at 192 (quoting Nastassia Walsh & Tracy Velazquez, Registering
Harm: The Adam Walsh Act and Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, Champion, Dec. 2009, at
20, 23).
215. See Halbrook, supra note 77, at 17.
216. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (discussing
what constitutes “severe” emotional distress).
217. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69
(2010)).
218. See discussion supra Section III.B.
219. Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 37–38.
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special circumstances of juveniles, individualized consideration in matters of
juvenile justice are especially important.220 Though Miller may be read to
require only individualized consideration for the most severe punishments,
J.D.B. expanded the requirement of individualized consideration beyond
punishment. In creating a “reasonable juvenile” standard for the Miranda
custody analysis, J.D.B. opted in favor of a less administrable solution for the
sake of protecting juveniles’ constitutional rights.221 With these cases comes a
recognition that uniform solutions and hard-and-fast rules will not suffice
when it comes to juveniles.
Another potential criticism of this framework is that it is inferior to a
legislative solution. It might instead be preferable to alter sentencing guide-
lines or allow for individualized consideration in the sex offender statutes
themselves. Such a solution would admittedly be more administrable and
uniform. While such a solution would be preferable, political realities pre-
clude it. For reasons discussed above, legislatures have proven a poor forum
for considering the rights of juvenile offenders.222 The lack of political will to
soften restrictions on juvenile offenders, together with the lack of demo-
cratic accountability to juvenile offenders, makes the development of sound
policy in this area highly unlikely.223
Condensing the excessiveness inquiry for juveniles into three triggers
allows a legislature to continue juvenile registration in cases where it remains
reasonable. Unlike a strict scrutiny test, the state need not show that its
scheme is nearly perfect. Instead, it need only show that the legislation
avoids certain pitfalls.
Conclusion
Without a presumption of constitutionality, the Court could conduct
the Mendoza-Martinez analysis without a thumb on the scale in favor of the
legislation’s constitutionality. It is appropriate to suspend the presumption
because of the legislature’s lack of democratic accountability to juvenile of-
fenders, as well as its comparative lack of institutional competence in areas
relating to juvenile crime and punishment. In lieu of the current Mendoza-
Martinez analysis, courts should adopt a new framework. Under the new
framework, courts should determine that sanctions constitute punishment
where one of three triggers is activated. Assuming the soundness of previous
scholarship relating to juvenile sex offender registration, it will not be diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that juvenile sex offender registration—as
currently administered—activates one of these triggers, and does so
frequently.
220. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
221. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S 261, 271–81 (2011).
222. See discussion supra Section II.B.
223. See discussion supra Section II.B.
